ABSTRACT k-anonymization is an important privacy protection mechanism in data publishing. While there has been a great deal of work in recent years, almost all considered a single static release. Such mechanisms only protect the data up to the first release or first recipient. In practical applications, data is published continuously as new data arrive; the same data may be anonymized differently for a different purpose or a different recipient. In such scenarios, even when all releases are properly k-anonymized, the anonymity of an individual may be unintentionally compromised if recipient cross-examines all the releases received or colludes with other recipients. Preventing such attacks, called correspondence attacks, faces major challenges. In this paper, we systematically characterize the correspondence attacks and propose an efficient anonymization algorithm to thwart the attacks in the model of continuous data publishing.
INTRODUCTION k-anonymization
is a promising approach to data publishing while protecting the identity of individuals. The data holder has a table of the form [1] D(Explicit identifier, Quasi identifier, Sensitive attribute).
Explicit identifier consists of identifying information (such as SSN and names). Quasi identifier (such as date of birth, gender, and zip code) does not reveal identity, but can be used to link to a person or an explicit identity in some external sources [11] . Sensitive attribute consists of other personspecific information (such as medical and DNA entries). Instead of publishing the original table D, the data holder publishes an anonymized release R(QID, Sensitive attribute), * The work was supported by research grants from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and ENCS faculty start-up funds from Concordia University.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. where QID is a k-anonymized version of Quasi identifier [11] : each record belongs to an equivalence class of size at least k and all records in an equivalence class are made indistinguishable with respect to QID by hiding some details. In a k-anonymized release, if an individual is linked to a record through QID, it is also linked to at least k − 1 other records. Sensitive attribute is not modified because the data usefulness depends on the exact information of this attribute.
k-anonymization has been primarily studied for a single static release of data [3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13] . In practice, however, new data arrives continuously and up-to-date data has to be published to researchers in a timely manner. One approach is to anonymize and publish new records separately each time they arrive. This naive approach suffers from severe data distortion because small increments are anonymized independently. Moreover, it is difficult to analyze a collection of independently anonymized data sets. For example, if the country name (e.g., Canada) is used in the release for first month records and if the city name (e.g., Toronto) is used in the release for second month records, counting the total number of persons born in Toronto is not possible. Another approach is to enforce the later release to be no more specialized than the previous releases [13] . The major drawback is that each subsequent release gets increasingly distorted, even if more new data are available.
A Practical Publishing Model
Suppose that the data holder previously collected a set of records D 1 timestamped T 1 , and published a k-anonymized version of D 1 , denoted release R 1 . Then the data holder collects a new set of records D 2 timestamped T 2 and wants to publish a k-anonymized version of all records collected so far, D1 ∪ D2, denoted release R2. Note, Di contains the "events" that happened at time T i . An event, once occurred, becomes part of the history, therefore, cannot be deleted. This publishing scenario is different from update scenario in standard data management where deletion of records can occur. Ri simply publishes the "history", i.e., the events that happened up to time T i . A real-life example can be found in California where the hospitals are required to submit specific demographic data of all discharged patients every six months.
1 The above publishing model directly serves the following scenarios.
Continuous data publishing. Publishing the release R 2 for D 1 ∪ D 2 would permit an analysis on the data over the combined time period of T1 and T2. It also takes the advantage of data abundance over a longer period of time to reduce data distortion required by anonymization.
Multi-purpose publishing. With D 2 being empty, R 1 and R2 can be two releases of D1 anonymized differently to serve different information needs, such as correlation analysis vs clustering analysis, or different recipients, such as a medical research team vs a health insurance company, who may collude together by sharing their received data.
We first describe the publishing model with two releases and then show the extension beyond two releases in Section 7. Following the convention of k-anonymity [13] , we assume that each individual has at most one record in D 1 ∪D 2 . This assumption holds in many real-life databases. For example, in a normalized customer data table, each customer has only one profile. In the case that an individual has a record in both D 1 and D 2 , there will be two duplicates in D 1 ∪ D 2 and one of them can be removed in a preprocessing. As in [17] , we assume that the records of an individual remain the same in D1 and D2.
Correspondence Attacks
We show, by an example, that the traditional k-anonymization is insufficient for preventing correspondence attacks. Example 1.1. Consider Tables 1-2 , where QID is [Birthplace,Job] and the sensitive attribute is Disease. The data holder (e.g., a hospital) published the 5-anonymized R 1 for 5 records a 1 -a 5 collected in the previous month (i.e., timestamp T1). The anonymization was done by generalizing UK and France into Europe; the original values in the brackets are not released. In the current month (i.e., timestamp T 2 ), the data holder collects 5 new records (i.e., b 6 -b 10 ) and publishes the 5-anonymized R 2 for all 10 records collected so far. Records are shuffled to prevent mapping between R1 and R2 by their order. The recipients know that every record in R1 has a "corresponding record" in R 2 (that originates from the same record in D 1 ). One recipient, the attacker, tries to identify his neighbor Alice's record from R1 or R2, knowing that Alice was admitted to the hospital, as well as, Alice's QID and timestamp. Consider the following scenarios.
Scenario 
RID Birthplace
is excluded since Alice has timestamp T2.
In each scenario, at least one matching record is excluded, so the 5-anonymity of Alice is compromised.
All these attacks "crack" some matching records in R 1 or R 2 by inferring that they either do not originate from Alice's QID or do not have Alice's timestamp. Such cracked records are not related to Alice, thus, excluding them allows the attacker to focus on a smaller set of candidates. Since cracked records are identified by cross-examining R 1 and R 2 and by exploiting the knowledge that every record in R1 has a "corresponding record" in R2, such attacks are called correspondence attacks.
Having access to only R 1 and R 2 , not D 1 and D 2 , cracking a record is not straightforward. For example, to crack a record in R1 for Alice having QID= [France, Lawyer] , the attacker must show that the original birthplace in the record is not France, whereas the published Europe may or may not originate from France. Similarly, it is not straightforward to infer the timestamp of a record in R 2 . For example, any three of b1,b2,b3,b7,b8 can be the corresponding records of a1,a2,a3, so none of them must have timestamp T1. In fact, observing only the published records, there are many possible assignments of corresponding records between R 1 and R2. For example, one assignment is (a1, b1), (a2, b2), (a3, b3), (a4, b4), (a5, b5), where the original record represented by (
. In this assignment, the original record represented by (a1, b7) is [France, Lawyer, Flu]. All such assignments are possible to the attacker because they all produce the same "view", i.e., R 1 and R 2 . Detecting correspondence attacks assuming this view of the attacker is non-trivial.
Contributions
In this paper, we formalize the notion of correspondence attacks and present an approach to prevent such attacks. We focus on answering several key questions: • What are exactly the records that can be cracked based on R 1 and R 2 ? We systematically characterize the set of cracked records by correspondence attacks and propose the notion of BCF-anonymity to measure anonymity assuming this power of the attacker (Section 4).
• Can R2 be anonymized such that R2 satisfies BCF-anonymity yet remains useful? We show that the optimal BCFanonymization is NP-hard. Then, we develop a practically efficient algorithm to determine a BCF-anonymized R 2 (Section 5), study its data quality (Section 6), and extend the proposed approach to deal with more than two releases and other privacy notions (Section 7).
RELATED WORK
Anonymizing continuous data is a challenging problem because the attacker has increasingly more knowledge about the previously published data. Some anonymization methods [2, 10, 14, 17] have been proposed recently.
[2] is an early study which investigates the continuous data publishing scenario, but the anonymization method relies on delaying records release and the delay can be unbounded. Consequently, records could not be released in a timely fashion. In our method, records collected at timestamp Ti are always published in the corresponding release R i without delay. Moreover, [2] guarantees a relatively weak privacy notion, which requires each equivalence class to contain at least distinct sensitive values. This privacy notion is not safe if some sensitive values dominate an equivalence class. In contrast, our proposed approach can achieve anonymity, confidence bounding [15] , (α,k)-anonymity [16] , and other safer notions of -diversity [8] .
[17] presents the first study to address both record insertions and deletions in data re-publication. It proposes a new privacy notion called m-invariance: if a record r has been published in releases R i , · · · , R j where i < j, then all QID groups containing r must have the same set of sensitive values, called the signature [17] . This will ensure the intersection of sensitive values over all such groups does not reduce the set of sensitive values. To maintain m-invariance, their method adds "counterfeit records" corresponding to infrequent sensitive values to make those equivalence classes have the same signature. Counterfeits, however, may not be acceptable in some cases. Suppose a pharmaceutical company wants to analyze patient reaction to certain drugs. Infrequent sensitive values such as the negative reactions are the most interesting ones and the target for research. However, with many counterfeit negative reactions which correspond to no real-life entities, it is difficult to deploy the results obtained from such data. Note that, even in the "insertion only" case, adding counterfeits is still necessary, for example, when a record with a new sensitive value is added. In contrast, our method guarantees data truthfulness at record level: each published record corresponds to a real-life entity.
Our previous work [14] studies the problem of anonymizing sequential releases where each subsequent release publishes a different subset of attributes for the same set of records. In contrast, this paper considers each release that combines new records with previously collected records over the same set of attributes. The attack and prevention mechanisms are very different in these two publishing models.
[10] considers the scenario that the Case-ID of records must be published. In our work, we consider the scenario that the data holder has removed the Case-ID of records, so the attack based on Case-ID [10] does not occur. Instead, we deal with a new type of attacks even if no Case-ID is published. [5] proposes an efficient index structure to incrementally k-anonymize each individual release, but it does not address the correspondence attacks studied in this paper. A generalized attribute Aj can be represented by a "cut" through its taxonomy tree. A cut of a tree is a subset of values in the tree which contains exactly one value on each root-to-leaf path [4] . R1 and R2 in Tables 1-2 are examples. There are some other generalization schemes, such as multidimensional [7] and local recoding [10, 16, 17] , that cause less data distortion, but these schemes make data analysis difficult. In local recoding, for example, some instances of Lawyer can be generalized to Professional while some instances of Lawyer remain ungeneralized. As a result, counting the number of lawyers becomes impossible because some lawyers are represented by professionals. Furthermore, many standard data mining methods, e.g., decision tree analysis, treat Lawyer and Professional as two independent values. Consequently, the decision tree may contain two branches, (Lawyer → class1) and (Professional → class2). It is unclear which branch should be used to classify a new lawyer.
PROBLEM STATEMENTS
In a k-anonymized table, records are partitioned into equivalence classes of size (i.e., the number of records) at least k. Each equivalence class contains all records having the same value on QID. We use qid to denote both a value on QID and the corresponding equivalence class. |qid| denotes the size of the equivalence class. A group g in an equivalence class qid consists of the records in qid that have the same value on the sensitive attribute. In other words, a group contains all records in the table that are indistinguishable wrt QID and the sensitive attribute. A person matches a (generalized) record in a table if her QID is either equal to or more specific than the record on every attribute in QID.
Correspondence Attacks
The data holder previously collected some data D 1 timestamped T 1 and published a k-anonymized version of D 1 , called release R1. Then the data holder collects new data D2 timestamped T2 and publishes a k-anonymized version of D 1 ∪ D 2 , called release R 2 . An attacker, one of the recipients of R 1 and R 2 , attempts to identify the record of some target person, denoted by P , from R 1 or R 2 . We assume that the attacker is aware of P 's QID and timestamp. In addition, the attacker has the following correspondence knowledge: (1) Every record timestamped T 1 (i.e., from D 1 ) has a record in R 1 and a record in R 2 , called corresponding records. (2) Every record timestamped T 2 (i.e., from D 2 ) has a record in R2, but not in R1. Below is an intuition of the three possible attacks based on such knowledge.
Forward-attack, denoted by F-attack(R 1 , R 2 ). P has timestamp T 1 and the attacker tries to identify P 's record in the cracking release R 1 using the background release R 2 . Since P has a record in R 1 and a record in R 2 , if a matching record r1 in R1 represents P , there must be a corresponding record in R2 that matches P 's QID and agrees with r1 on the sensitive attribute. If r 1 fails to have such a corresponding record in R 2 , then r 1 does not originate from P 's QID, and therefore, r 1 can be excluded from the possibility of P 's record. Scenario I is an example.
Cross-attack, denoted by C-attack(R1, R2). P has timestamp T 1 and the attacker tries to identify P 's record in the cracking release R 2 using the background release R 1 . Similar to F-attack, if a matching record r 2 in R 2 represents P , there must be a corresponding record in R1 that matches P 's QID and agrees with r2 on the sensitive attribute. If r2 fails to have such a corresponding record in R 1 , then r 2 either has timestamp T 2 or does not originate from P 's QID, and therefore, r 2 can be excluded from the possibility of P 's record. Scenario II is an example.
Backward-attack, denoted by B-attack(R 1 , R 2 ). P has timestamp T 2 and the attacker tries to identify P 's record in the cracking release R 2 using the background release R 1 . In this case, P has a record in R2, but not in R1. Therefore, if a matching record r2 in R2 has to be the corresponding record of some record in R 1 , then r 2 has timestamp T 1 , and therefore, r 2 can be excluded from the possibility of P 's record. Scenario III is an example. Note that it is impossible to single out the matching records in R2 that have timestamp T2 but do not originate from P 's QID since all records at T 2 have no corresponding record in R 1 . Table 3 summarizes all four possible combinations of cracking release (R 1 or R 2 ) and target P 's timestamp (T 1 or T 2 ). Note that if a target P has timestamp T2, P does not have a record in R1, so it is impossible to crack P 's record in R1 in such a case and there are only three types of attacks.
All these attacks are based on making some inferences about corresponding records. There are many possible assignments of corresponding records and each assignment implies a possibly different underlying data (D 1 , D 2 ), not necessarily the underlying data (D 1 , D 2 ) collected by the data holder. Since all such underlying data (D 1 , D 2 ) generate the same published R1 and R2, they are all possible to the attacker who knows about the data only through the published R 1 and R 2 . This observation motivates us to consider only the inferences that do not depend on a particular choice of a candidate (D 1 , D 2 ). First, let us define the space of such candidates underlying data for the published R1 and R2.
Consider a record r in R1 or R2. An instantiation of r is a raw record that agrees with r on the sensitive attribute and specializes r or agrees with r on QID. A generator of (R1, R2) is an assignment, denoted by I, from the records in R1 ∪ R2 to their instantiations such that: for each record r 1 in R 1 , there is a distinct record r 2 in R 2 such that I(r 1 ) = I(r 2 ); (r 1 , r 2 ) is called buddies under I. Duplicate records are treated as distinct records. The buddy relationship is injective: no two records have the same buddy. Every record in R1 has a buddy in R2 and exactly |R1| records in R 2 have a buddy in R 1 . If r 2 in R 2 has a buddy in R 1 , I(r 2 ) has timestamp T 1 ; otherwise I(r 2 ) has timestamp T 2 . Intuitively, a generator represents an underlying data for (R1, R2) and each pair of buddies represent corresponding records in the generator. Tables 1-2 . One generator has the buddies: Consider a record r in R1 or R2. Suppose that for some generator I, the instantiation I(r) matches P 's QID and timestamp. In this case, excluding r means information loss for the purpose of attack because there is some underlying data for (R1, R2) (given by I) in which r is P 's record. On the other hand, suppose that for no generator I the instantiation I(r) can match P 's QID and timestamp. Then r definitely cannot be P 's record, so excluding r losses no information to the attacker. Our attack model is based on excluding such non-representing records.
For a target P with timestamp T 1 , if P has a record in R 1 , P must match some qid 1 in R 1 and some qid 2 in R 2 . Therefore, we assume such a matching pair (qid 1 , qid 2 ) for P . Recall that a group gi in an equivalence class qidi consists of the records in qidi that agree on the sensitive attribute. For a generator I, I(g i ) denotes the set of records
Below, we present the formal definition for each type of attacks. ri, gi, qidi refer to records, groups and equivalence classes from Ri, i = 1, 2.
F-attack
The F-attack seeks to identify as many as possible records in an equivalence class qid 1 that do not represent P in any choice of the generator. Such cracked records definitely cannot be P 's record, and therefore, can be excluded. Since all records in a group are identical, the choice of cracked records in a group does not make a difference and determining the number of cracked records (i.e., the crack size) is sufficient to define the attack. Definition 3.1 (Crack size). Assume that a target P has timestamp T1 and matches (qid1, qid2). A group g1 in qid1 has crack size c wrt P if c is maximal such that for every generator I, at least c records in I(g 1 ) do not match P 's QID.
If g 1 has crack size c, at least c records in g 1 can be excluded from the possibility of P 's record. On the other hand, with c being maximal, excluding more than c records will result in excluding some record that can possibly be P 's record. Therefore, the crack size is both the minimum and the maximum number of records that can be excluded from g 1 without any information loss for the purpose of attack. Definition 3.1 does not explain how to effectively determine the crack size, which is the topic in Section 4. For now, assuming that the crack size is known, we want to measure the anonymity after excluding the cracked records from each equivalence class. The F-anonymity below measures the minimum size of an equivalence class in R 1 after excluding all records cracked by F-attack.
Definition 3.2 (F-anonymity).
Let F (P, qid 1 , qid 2 ) be the sum of the crack sizes for all groups in qid1 wrt P .
C-attack
Definition 3.3 (Crack size). Assume that a target P has timestamp T 1 and matches (qid 1 , qid 2 ). A group g 2 in qid 2 has crack size c wrt P if c is maximal such that for every generator I, at least c records in I(g2) do not match either P 's timestamp or P 's QID. Definition 3.4 (C-anonymity). Let C(P, qid 1 , qid 2 ) be the sum of crack sizes of all groups in qid2 wrt P . C(qid1, qid2) denotes the maximum C(P, qid1, qid2) for any target P that matches (qid 1 , qid 2 ). C(qid 2 ) denotes the maximum C(qid 1 , qid 2 ) for all qid 1 in R 1 . The C-anonymity of (R 1 , R 2 ), denoted by CA(R 1 , R 2 ) or CA, is the minimum (|qid 2 | − C(qid 2 )) for all qid2 in R2.
B-attack
A target P for B-attack has timestamp T 2 , thus, does not have to match any qid 1 in R 1 . 
Definition 3.5 (Crack size
Definition 3.6 (B-anonymity). Let B(P, qid 2 ) be the sum of the crack sizes of all groups in qid 2 wrt P . B(qid 2 ) denotes the maximum B(P, qid2) for any target P that matches qid2. The B-anonymity of (R1, R2), denoted by BA(R1, R2) or BA, is the minimum (|qid 2 |−B(qid 2 )) for all qid 2 in R 2 .
Two Problems
A BCF-anonymity requirement states that all of BA, CA and F A are equal to or larger than some data-holder-specified threshold. We study two problems. The first problem checks whether a BCF-anonymity requirement is satisfied, assuming the input (i.e., R 1 and R 2 ) as viewed by the attacker.
Definition 3.7 (Detection). Given R 1 and R 2 , as described above, the BCF-detection problem is to determine whether a BCF-anonymity requirement is satisfied.
The second problem is to produce a generalized R2 that satisfies a given BCF-anonymity requirement and remains useful. This problem assumes the input as viewed by the data holder, that is, R 1 , D 1 and D 2 , and uses an information metric to measure the usefulness of the generalized R 2 . Examples are discernibility cost [12] and data distortion [11] .
Definition 3.8 (Anonymization). Given R 1 , D 1 and D2, as described above, the BCF-anonymization problem is to generalize R2 = D1 ∪D2 so that R2 satisfies a given BCFanonymity requirement and remains as useful as possible wrt a specified information metric.
In the special case of empty D 1 , F-attack and C-attack do not happen and B-anonymity coincides with k-anonymity of R2 for D2. Since the optimal k-anonymization is NPhard [9] , the optimal BCF-anonymization is NP-hard.
So far, we have assumed that both R 1 and R 2 are received by one recipient. In the special case of empty D 2 , R 1 and R 2 are two different generalized versions of the same data D 1 to serve different information requirements or different recipients. In this case, there are potentially multiple attackers. What happens if the attackers collude together? The collusion problem may seem to be very different. Indeed, Definitions 3.7-3.8 subsume the collusion problem. Consider the worst-case collusion scenario in which all recipients collude together by sharing all of their received data. This scenario is equivalent to publishing all releases to one attacker.
DETECTION
The key to the BCF-detection problem is computing the crack size in Definitions 3.1, 3.3, 3.5. We present a method for computing the crack size of a group. Our insight is that if a record r represents the target P for some generator, its buddy in the other release (i.e., the corresponding record) must satisfy some conditions. If such conditions fail, r does not represent P for that generator. One of the conditions is the following "comparable" relationship. 
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that P matches (qid 1 , qid 2 ) and that (r1, r2) are buddies for a generator I. If I(r1) and I(r2) match P 's QID, then r1 is in g1 if and only if r2 is in g2, where (g 1 , g 2 ) is in CG(qid 1 , qid 2 ). Theorem 4.1 follows becuase buddies agree on the sensitive attribute and I(r 1 ) and I(r 2 ) matching P 's QID implies that r 1 is in qid 1 and r 2 is in qid 2 . The next two lemmas are used to derive an upper bound on crack size. The first states some transitivity of the "comparable" relationship, which will be used to construct a required generator in the upper bound proof. 
F-attack
Assume that P matches (qid 1 , qid 2 ). Consider a group pair (g 1 , g 2 ) in CG(qid 1 , qid 2 ). Since the buddy relationship is injective, if g1 contains more records than g2, i.e.) = {(g 1 , g 2 ), (g 1 , g 2 )}. |g 1 | = 3,
C-attack
By a similar argument, at least |g 2 |−min(|g 1 
, |g 2 | = 3 and |g 1 | = 2. Thus g2 has crack size 0 and g 2 has crack size 1.
B-attack
Suppose that P matches some qid2 in R2. Let g2 be a group in qid 2 . The crack size of g 2 is related to the number of records in g 2 that have a buddy in R 1 (thus timestamp T 1 ). Let G 1 denote the set of records in R 1 comparable to g 2 . So G1 contains all the records in R1 that can have a buddy in g2. Let G2 denote the set of records in R2 comparable to some record in G 1 . The next lemma implies that all records in G 1 can have a buddy in G 2 − g 2 . Lemma 4.3. Every record in G2 is comparable to all records in G1 and only those records in G1.
Proof. Each record r2 in G2 is comparable to some record r 1 in G 1 and both r 1 and r 1 are comparable to g 2 , where r 1 is any record in G 1 . It then follows from Lemma 4.1 that (r 1 , r 2 ) are comparable. For the second part, suppose that a record r2 in G2 is comparable to some record r1 in R1. Note that r2 is comparable to some record r 1 in G1, which is comparable to g 2 . Lemma 4.1 then implies that r 1 is comparable to g 2 . By the definition of G 1 , r 1 is in G 1 .
From Lemma 4.3, all records in G1 and only those records in G1 can have a buddy in G2. Each record in G1 has its buddy either in g 2 or in G 2 − g 2 , but not in both. If 
c, where is over g 2 in qid 2 and g 2 has the crack size c determined in (1) and (2).
Proof. (3) follows from Definition 3.6. For (1), |G 2 | < |g 2 | implies |G 1 | = 0 (otherwise G 2 contains at least all the records in g2 and |G2| ≥ |g2|). This means that the records in g2 have no buddy (for any generator), thus, have timestamp T 2 . In this case, g 2 has crack size 0 wrt P . We prove (2) : From the discussion above, at least c (as in the theorem) records in g 2 have timestamp T 1 (for any generator). To show that c is also an upper bound, we construct a generator in which exactly c records in g2 have timestamp T 1 
Thus g 2 has crack size 1 and g 2 has crack size 0.
Equivalence of F-attack and C-attack
F-attack and C-attack are motivated under different scenarios and have a different characterization of crack size. Despite such differences, we show that these attacks are not independent of each other at all; in fact, F A = CA. First, we show the following lemma as a stepping stone. − F (qid 1 , qid 2 ) ) and CA is the minimum (|qid2| − C(qid1, qid2) ). The occurrence of condition (1) decreases F A by increasing F (qid1, qid2) . However, the occurrence of condition (1) 
ANONYMIZATION
We now present an algorithm for anonymizing R2 for
Our approach iteratively specializes R 2 starting from the most generalized state of R2. In the most generalized state, all values for each attribute Aj ∈ QID are generalized to the top most value in the taxonomy. Each specialization, for some attribute in QID, replaces a parent value with an appropriate child value in every record containing the parent value. Section 5.1 shows that F A, CA, and BA are non-increasing in this specialization process. Therefore, all further specializations can be pruned once any of the above requirements is violated. Section 5.2 presents an efficient algorithm for producing such a maximally specialized R 2 .
Anti-Monotonicity of BCF-Anonymity
Theorem 5.1. Each of F A, CA and BA is non-increasing with respect to a specialization on R 2 .
Proof. From Theorem 4.5, F A = CA, so we show the theorem only for F A and BA. Consider a specialization on R 2 in which qid 2 is specialized into qid F A: Recall that F A is the minimum (|qid 1 | − F (qid 1 )) over all qid 1 in R 1 . F (qid 1 ) = max (F (qid 1 , qid 2 ) ) over all qid 2 comparable to qid 1 . F (qid 1 , qid 2 ) = c, where is over (g1, g2) in CG(qid1, qid2) and c = |g1| − min(|g1|, |g2|) given by Theorem 4.2. We show that F (qid1) is non-decreasing wrt the above specialization. If qid 2 is not comparable to qid 1 , qid i 2 's remain not comparable to qid 1 . Assume that qid 2 is comparable to qid 1 . In this case, the term F (qid1, qid2) in max (F (qid1, qid2) ) is replaced with the terms
BA: Recall that BA is the minimum (|qid2| − B(qid2)) over all qid2 in R2. B(qid2) = c, where is over the groups g 2 in qid 2 and c is the crack size of g 2 . Unlike F A, the specialization on R 2 decreases both |qid 2 | and B(qid 2 ). We show that the decrease of |qid 2 | is at least as much as the decrease of B(qid2), which implies that |qid 
Algorithm
Finding an optimal BCF-anonymized R2 is NP-hard. Our approach BCF-anonymizer, summarized in Algorithm 1, aims at producing a maximally specialized (suboptimal) BCFanonymized R2 which any further specialization leads to a violation. It starts with the most generalized R2. At any time, R 2 contains the generalized records of D 1 ∪ D 2 and Cut2 j gives the generalization cut for A j ∈ QID. Each equivalence class qid 2 in R 2 is associated with a set of groups g2 with stored |g2|. Each group g2 is associated with the set of raw records in D1∪D2 generalized to the group. R1 is represented similarly with |qid 1 | and |g 1 | stored, except that no raw record is kept for g 1 . Cut1 j contains the generalization cut A j ∈ QID in R 1 . Cut1 j never change once created.
Initially, ∪Cut2j and the candidate list contain the most general value AN Yj for every Aj ∈ QID (Lines 1-3) . In each iteration, we examine the first valid candidate specialization ranked by a criterion Score. If the candidate w is valid, that is, not violating the BCF-anonymity after its specialization, we specialize w on R2 (Lines 6-10); otherwise, we remove w from the candidate list (Line 12). This iteration is repeated until there is no more candidate. From Theorem 5.1, the returned R 2 is maximal (suboptimal). Score ranks the candidates by their "information worth." We employ the discernibility cost [12] which charges a penalty to each record for being indistinguishable from other records. For each record
Output: a BCF-anonymized R 2 . 1: generalize every value for A j ∈ QID in R 2 to AN Y j ; 2: let candidate list = ∪Cut2 j containing all AN Y j ; 3: sort candidate list by Score in descending order; 4: while the candidate list is not empty do 5: if the first candidate w in candidate list is valid then 6:
7:
compute Score for all w i ;
8:
remove w from ∪Cut2 j and the candidate list;
9:
add w 1 , · · · , wz to ∪Cut2 j and the candidate list;
10:
sort the candidate list by Score in descending order; in an equivalence class qid 2 , this penalty is |qid 2 |. To minimize the discernibility cost, we choose the specialization w that maximizes Score(w), where Score(w) = qidw |qidw| 2 over all qidw containing w.
In general, Lines 5-7 require scanning all pairs (qid 1 , qid 2 ) and all records in R 2 , which is highly inefficient for a large data set. We present an incremental computation of F A, CA, and BA that examines only comparable pairs (qid1, qid2) and raw records in R2 that are involved in the current specialization. Let {w 1 , · · · , w z } be the set of child values of the winning candidate w on Line 6. Let qid w be a qid 2 containing w and let qid w 1 , . . . , qid wz be the new qids resulting from specializing qidw. Let gw be a group in qidw and gw i be a group in qidw i .
Line 6: To perform the specialization of w efficiently, for each value v in ∪Cut2 j , we create Link [v] [v] to which qid w was previously linked, except for Link [w] . The overhead for maintaining these links is negligible. [4] shows that the time complexity of this specialization procedure is linear in |R 2 |.
Line 7: In the same scan of Link[
To check the validity of w, we introduce a data structure, called GT ree1, to index all comparable qid1 in R1 for a given qid 2 in R 2 . GT ree1 has one level per attribute in QID followed by the leaf level for the sensitive attribute. Each root-to-leaf path in GT ree1 represents a group g 1 in R1. To find all qid1 in GT ree1 that are comparable to qid2, we traverse GT ree1 in a depth-first manner. At the level for an attribute A ∈ QID, if qid 2 [A] and qid 1 [A] are not on the same path in the taxonomy of A, the entire subtree below qid1[A] is pruned. On reaching a node on the level |QID|, the qid1 at the node is comparable to qid2. GT ree1 is static. Below, we update F A and BA using GT ree1.
5: end for 6: end for Updating F A: F A is the minimum (|qid1| − F (qid1)) over all qid 1 in R 1 , where F (qid 1 ) = max(F (qid 1 , qid 2 )) over all qid 2 comparable to qid 1 . F (qid 1 , qid 2 ) is a function of |g 1 | and |g2| for (g1, g2) in CG(qid1, qid2). We maintain |g2|, F A, and F (qid1) on performing each specialization. For each qid w i on Link[w i ], find all comparable qid 1 (using GT ree1) and update F (qid 1 ) and F A as shown in Procedure 2. The update on Line 3 exploits the property that F (qid 1 ) is nondecreasing wrt a specialization on R2 (Theorem 5.1). The computation is proportional to the number of comparable (qid 1 , qid w i ) for all new qid w i added in the current iteration.
Updating BA: BA is the minimum (|qid 2 | − B(qid 2 )) over all qid 2 in R 2 , where B(qid 2 ) is a function of |G 1 (g 2 )|, |G2(g2)| and |g2| for the groups g2 in qid2. G1(g2) denotes the set of groups in R1 comparable to g2, G2(g2) denotes the set of groups in R 2 comparable to any group in G 1 (g 2 ).
We maintain |G 1 (g 2 )|, |G 2 (g 2 )| and |g 2 | on specializing qid 2 . 
where g w is the corresponding group of qid w . Note that |G1(gw)| and |G2(gw)| were stored with gw.
EMPIRICAL STUDY
We studied the threat of correspondence attacks and the usefulness of the BCF-anonymized R 2 . We employed a publicly available census data set, Adult, previously used in [2, 4, 6, 8, 14, 15] . After removing all records with missing values, there were 30,162 and 15,060 records in the training and testing sets on 8 categorical attributes. Refer to [4] for the properties and taxonomy of the attributes. We specified D1 to contain all records in the testing set, and considered the following three cases of D2 at timestamp T2: • allD2: D 2 contains all 30,162 records in the training set, modelling a "large" set of new records at T 2 . We specified two choices of sensitive attributes. In Sen1, the sensitive attribute is chosen to be the attribute having the most number of distinct values, which is Native-country, and QID contains the remaining 7 attributes. In Sen3, the sensitive attribute is chosen to be the three attributes having the most number of distinct values, which is {Native-country, Education, Occupation}, and QID contains the remaining 5 attributes. Sen3 has a more restrictive buddy relationship than Sen1.
Two sets of experiments were conducted. In the first set, we studied the violation of BCF-anonymity when both R 1 and R 2 are k-anonymized individually as proposed in [5] . In the second set, we anonymized R2 by the BCF-anonymizer and evaluated its quality. All experiments were conducted on Pentium IV 2.4GHz PC with 512MB of RAM. The BCFanonymizer took less than 7 seconds, including disk I/O operations. This shows that the algorithm is highly effective.
Detecting Violations
For each pair of (D 1 , D 2 ) described above, we generalized D 1 and D 1 ∪ D 2 into k-anonymized R 1 and k-anonymized R 2 separately, by modifying the algorithm in Section 5 to enforce the k-anonymity on a single table without concerning correspondence attacks. We then measured F A, CA and BA on the generalized R 1 and R 2 . Since F A = CA (Theorem 4.5), which was also confirmed by our experiments, we present the results for F-attack and B-attack. While F A generally increases as k increases, there is no guarantee that F A ≥ k. Figure 1b shows that 4 out of the 5 test cases have F A < k for Sen3 and allD2. The most severe case occurs at k = 40 and F A = 21, where the anonymity of some individuals has been decreased by 48% due to F-attack. Staying above the dash line does not mean no cracked records; rather, it only means that the Fanonymity stays above k. F A does not increase monotonically as k increases. There are two reasons. First, with a larger k, R1 was less specialized, which led to a larger crack size in R 1 . Second, with a larger k, some specialization on R 2 valid for a smaller k became invalid and a different sequence of specializations on R2 was exploited.
A larger size |D2| has mixed effects on the crack size |g 1 |−min(|g 1 |, |g 2 |): having more records at T 2 means larger |g 2 |, but also means less generalization in R 2 , thus, smaller |g 2 |. For the more restrictive buddy relationship of Sen3, violations occur more frequently in the case of allD2 where the decrease of |g2| becomes the dominant factor due to less generalization in R 2 . Comparing Figures 1a-1b , Sen3 suffers more violations than Sen1. As the sensitive attribute gets more restrictive for Sen3, both |g 1 | and |g 2 | become smaller. For the larger number of new records in allD2, however, the decrease of |g2| dominates, therefore causes more violations.
B-attack: Figures 1c-1d depict BA for Sen1 and Sen3. Unlike F-attack, with fewer new records in D 2 (i.e., 200D2 and 2000D2), violations BA < k occur more frequently and severely since many records in an equivalence class have timestamp T 1 , which are deemed unrelated to the target having timestamp T 2 . The most severe case occurs at k = 80 for Sen1 in 200D2 with BA = 1. In other words, some target was uniquely identified since all other matching records in R2 were correctly identified as having timestamp T1. Another difference from F-attack is that violations BA < k occur for both Sen1 and Sen3, and are more frequent and more severe for 200D2 and 2000D2 than for allD2.
This experiment suggested that a small or medium D2 is highly vulnerable to B-attack. As the increment D2 is typically small, the threat of B-attack is very real. A large D 2 can be vulnerable to F-attack due to the reduced general- 
ization in R2. This is especially so for a restrictive sensitive attribute. As a result, for neither small nor large D2 is the k-anonymity safe from correspondence attacks.
Preventing Violations
This experiment evaluates the quality of BCF-anonymized R2. The quality is measured by the discernibility cost [12] for R2, which is defined as the square sum of the sizes of all equivalence classes in R 2 , normalized by |R 2 | 2 . The normalized cost has the range from 0 to 1, with 0 being the best and 1 being the worst. For each run in the detection experiment, if there is a violation, we compare the discernibility cost of the following three alternatives.
• BCF-anonymized R 2 : R 2 is generalized by our BCFanonymizer to satisfy all of
This is the k-anonymized R 2 in the detection experiment and in [5] . This is not safe from correspondence attacks.
The records in D 2 are anonymized separately from those in D 1 . This alternative is safe because correspondence attacks cannot be applied to data sets representing disjoint sets of individuals. We evaluate the data quality of a BCF-anonymized R2 as follows. (1) We measure the penalty to achieve additional protection against all correspondence attacks, relative to the unsafe k-anonymized R2. (2) We measure the benefit to combine D1 and D2 into one release R2 for anonymization, relative to the safe k-anonymized D 2 . Figure 2 depicts the discernibility cost of the three alternatives. Note that Sen3 has a cost higher than Sen1 since more attributes are exactly preserved through the sensitive attribute and more generalization on the remaining QID attributes is required to achieve anonymity. Figures 2a-2d . A cross-examination of Figures 1c-1d reveals that for 200D2 and 2000D2 there is a very severe violation of BA ≥ k across all k. The violation was so severe that some target individuals were uniquely identified by the Battack. To prevent such severe violations, for example, the average increase of cost is 25% in Figure 2d . k-anonymized R 2 is completely unprotected although it has a lower cost.
BCF-anonymized
In Figure 2c , BCF-anonymized R 2 has a cost lower than k-anonymized R2 at k = 40, though the requirement is more restrictive. In this case, some top ranked specializations used for k-anonymized R 2 became invalid for BCF-anonymizer due to the additional requirement BA ≥ k, and some lower ranked specializations were selected, which actually resulted in a smaller overall cost. This is possible since the solutions are suboptimal. For a similar reason, a larger k could possibly produce a lower cost than a smaller k.
EXTENSIONS

Beyond Two Releases
We extend the two-release case to the general case involving more than two releases. Consider the raw data D1, · · · , Dn collected at timestamp T1, · · · , Tn. Let Ri denote the release for D 1 ∪ · · · ∪ D i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. All records in R i have the special timestamp, denoted by T * i , that matches any timestamp from T 1 , · · · , T i . The correspondence knowledge now has the form that every record in Ri (except the last one) has a corresponding record in all releases Rj such that j > i. The notion of "generators" can take this into account. Given more releases, the attacker can conduct two additional types of correspondence attacks described below.
Optimal micro attacks: The general idea is to choose the "best" background release, yielding the largest possible crack size, individually to crack each group. Consider the F-attack on R i as an example. The attacker now can choose any Rj with j > i as the background release because the correspondence knowledge holds for (Ri, Rj). Suppose that the target P has timestamp T i and matches (qid i , · · · , qid n ) and that (g i , · · · , g n ) are the corresponding groups that have the same sensitive value. Let c ij be the crack size of a group gi computed by Theorem 4.2 wrt (gi, gj) of (Ri, Rj) instead of (g1, g2) of (R1, R2). To the attacker, the "optimal" crack size of g i is max j {c ij } over all j > i. The number of cracked records in an equivalence class qid i wrt P , i.e., F (P, qid i , · · · , qid n ), is given by g i c i , where g i is a group in qidi and ci = maxj{cij} is the optimal crack size of gi.
Essentially, the threat of the F-attack on gi is determined by the largest crack size c ij contributed by a collection of "micro attacks" at the group level that each involves (the groups of) two releases at a time, i.e., (g i , g j ). For such micro attacks, the crack size cij can be computed by our method for two releases. Our insight is that it suffices to consider only micro attacks involving two releases. Suppose that a micro attack on g 1 employs the groups g 2 and g 3 from , |g 2 |) is the crack size produced by the micro attack using (g1, g2) and c13 = |g1| − min(|g1|, |g3|) is the crack size produced by the micro attack using (g1, g3).
The micro attacks for the three types of attacks can be represented as follows. Note that the crack size for these micro attacks can be directly computed by the methods in Section 4. Let gi be a group in Ri and gj be a group in Rj.
• F-attack(gi, gj), j > i: The target P has timestamp Ti and the attacker tries to crack the records in g i using g j of the background release R j . In this case, a cracked record does not originate from P 's QID.
• C-attack(g i , g j ), j > i: The target P has timestamp T i and the attacker tries to crack the records in g j using g i of the background release Ri. A cracked record either does not have timestamp T * i or does not originate from P 's QID. Note that if a record in g j does not have timestamp T * i , it has a timestamp from T i+1 , · · · , T j , therefore, does not match P 's timestamp.
• B-attack(g i , g j ), j > i: The target P has timestamp T j and the attacker tries to crack the records in g j using g i of the background release R i . Note that a cracked record has timestamp T * i (because of coming from gi), thus, does not match P 's timestamp. Composition of micro attacks: Another type of attack is to "compose" multiple micro attacks together (apply one after another ) in order to increase the crack size of a group.
